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I. INTRODUCTION
Multiple-Input multiple-output (MIMO) technology
has been widely studied in the communication literature,
providing exciting improvements to the capacity and
coverage of a network. MIMO radar technology has also
attracted significant interests recently. The key factor that
makes a MIMO radar superior to other radar systems is its
waveform diversity, indicating the ability of a MIMO radar
to simultaneously emit several diverse, possibly orthogonal
waveforms via multiple antennas, as compared to phased
array radars that transmit scaled versions of the same
waveform [1]. In the existing radar literature, there are
two primary MIMO schemes, those that employ colocated
antennas [2] and radars incorporating widely separated
antennas (bistatic and multistatic radars) [3]. MIMO radar
technology is exploited in the following dominant fields:
beamforming, waveform design, target-detection optimiza-
tion, and radar imaging [4]–[6]. Among the advantages
of MIMO radar technology is the direct applicability
of adaptive array techniques, adaptive beamforming
[7], power allocation optimization [8], higher angular
resolution, multiple targets detection [9], and the ability to
acquire the target’s geometrical characteristics through the
spatial diversity of the target’s radar cross section (RCS).
The gigantic growth of wireless multimedia applica-
tions and the need for faster communications in the last
decade have led to an increasing demand on radio fre-
quency bandwidth and an expanded share of existing fre-
quency allocations. Hence, the coexistence of radar and
wireless communication in a system has been proposed re-
cently to ease the competition over spectrum bandwidth
[10], [11]. In particular, this novel dual-function scheme
employs the same transmit and receive elements to achieve
simultaneously both radar target-detection purposes and in-
formation transfer to legitimate receivers [12]. A pioneering
joint radar-communication system was introduced in [13],
where the authors embedded information into the radar sig-
nal for communication purposes. More specifically, a set of
unique radar waveforms was designed, each representing
a communication symbol, while maintaining an acceptable
radar performance. The ability of multisensor radar sys-
tems to control and introduce variations in the sidelobe level
(SLL) toward a specific spatial direction has motivated the
devise of time-modulated (TM) or amplitude-modulated
dual-function radar-communication (DFRC) systems. The
main idea is to maintain a radar function in the main lobe of
the signal, while realizing a communication in the sidelobe.
To achieve this, Euziere et al. [14] utilized sparse TM arrays
or phase-only synthesis TM arrays to introduce variations
in the SLL toward a desired direction. A DFRC system em-
ploying sidelobe control of the transmit beamforming and
waveform diversity was developed in [15], where two trans-
mit weight vectors are designed to carry multiple simul-
taneously transmitted orthogonal waveforms, embedding a
sequence of information bits. Phase-rotational invariance in
tandem with transmit beamforming techniques have been
proposed in [16] for information embedding transmission.
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON AEROSPACE AND ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS VOL. 54, NO. 5 OCTOBER 2018 2481
Blunt et al. [17] and [18] addressed the problem of embed-
ding a covert communication signal amongst the scattering
from an incident radar pulse.
Most of the existing works in DFRC systems focused
on techniques to transmit information toward a legitimate
receiver, without paying much attention to the possibil-
ity of eavesdroppers in the environment. In the commu-
nication literature, the security of wireless transmission is
of great importance [19], [20]. The additional degrees of
freedom and the diversity gain offered by multiantenna
elements can facilitate secret communications in MIMO
communication systems [21]. Different MIMO secrecy rate
optimizations have been investigated in [22], in the pres-
ence of a multiple-antenna eavesdropper. In particular, two
optimization problems are designed, namely power mini-
mization and secrecy rate maximization problems. A sim-
ilar approach was studied in [23] with the addition of a
multiple-antenna cooperative jammer to induce further in-
terference to the eavesdropper, and hence maximize the
secrecy rate at the legitimate receiver. Friendly jammer
nodes have also been considered in [24] to confuse the
eavesdroppers by transmitting interfering signals toward
them and increase the physical layer security of a wiretap
fading channel. Introducing cooperative transmission into
secrecy communication systems to minimize the outage
probability was studied in [25]. Krikidis et al. [26] utilized
relay selection for secure cooperative networks. In particu-
lar, two relays were selected, one to assist the information
delivery to the receiver and a second to create interference
at the eavesdropper. Furthermore, another countermeasure
against the eavesdropper is to embed artificial noise in the
transmitted signal as investigated in [27] and [28], where
an isotropic artificial noise scheme based on an orthogonal
projection method [27] and a spatially selective artificial
noise obtained by optimal beamformers design [28] were
developed.
To the best of our knowledge, although the coexistence
of radar-communication systems is a fast emerging research
field, there is no previous work regarding secure transmis-
sions in these systems. The need for safe communication
in a DFRC system is further emphasized since the desired
communication may contain sensitive information, such as
target characterization and command and control signals.
Thus, in this paper, we propose a DFRC system that pro-
vides simultaneous target detection capabilities and secure
communication with a legitimate receiver. These aspects
render this model particularly attractive for defense appli-
cations, when the information is usually sensitive and con-
fidential. In particular, we introduce a DFRC system that
consists of a tracking MIMO radar, a legitimate communi-
cation receiver, and a target equipped with multiple anten-
nas. Principal objectives of the radar system are to attain a
desired detection performance and to transmit information
to the legitimate receiver while disabling the eavesdropper
decoding the communication signals. Hence, apart from the
target detection, safe communication is of utmost impor-
tance for our DFRC system. Following the aforementioned
communication literature, we utilize the notion of secrecy
rate to guarantee the safe information transfer among the
radar and the legitimate receiver, while satisfying a de-
sired criterion for target detection. In the scenario under
consideration, the target eavesdropper may intercept the
communication signal transmitted from the MIMO radar to
the legitimate receiver. In order to minimize the probabil-
ity of interception, we transmit a pseudorandom distortion
signal in addition to the information signal. This distortion
signal cancels the ability of the eavesdropper to decode
the information transmitted from the MIMO radar. How-
ever, the distortion signal can be used for target detection.
Thus, we design transmit covariance matrices of both the
communication signal and the distortion signal by solv-
ing three optimizations, namely secrecy rate maximization,
target return signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR)
maximization, and transmit power minimization.
The secrecy rate function for our radar system is non-
concave and renders all three optimizations nonconvex. In
order to reformulate the optimization problems as convex
problems, we utilize the Taylor series approximation of the
secrecy rate function, which is proven to be concave. The
resulting DFRC system enjoys both the required target-
detection performance and secure communications under a
specified resource budget.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The
system model and the definition of the secrecy rate for a
DFRC system is given in Section II. Section III focuses on
the system optimizations and the reformulation of the prob-
lems to convex form utilizing Taylor series approximation.
The simulation results and comments upon the results are
presented in Section IV and the final concluding remarks
are given in Section V.
Notation: We use bold lowercase letters and bold up-
percase letters to denote column vectors and matrices, re-
spectively. aH gives the Hermitian of the vector a and aT
denotes its transpose. A(i, j ) corresponds to the element
located on the ith row and j th column of matrix A. The
trace of a matrix A is represented by Tr(A). IM stands for
the M × M identity matrix. The Euclidean norm is denoted
by || · ||. An N × 1 vector of ones is indicated by 1N . The
notation [x] + stands for max{x, 0}.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a joint radar/communication network that
consists of a MIMO radar, a legitimate multiantenna re-
ceiver, and a target, as shown in Fig. 1. It is assumed that
the target incorporates a multiantenna receiver and may
intercept incoming signals. The two major objectives for
the radar are to secure a certain detection criterion for the
target and synchronously transmit information to the le-
gitimate receiver, while disabling the eavesdropping target
from decoding the information signal. In order to achieve
this, the radar transmits two different signals at the same
time, where both signals are used to detect the target. How-
ever, the first signal embeds the desired information for the
legitimate receiver, whereas the second signal consists of
false information to confuse the eavesdropper.
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Fig. 1. Joint MIMO radar-communication system with a target that
could also act as an eavesdropper.
It is presumed that the MIMO radar consists of M colo-
cated transmit/receive antennas. The legitimate receiver and
the eavesdropping target are equipped with Nc and Ne an-
tennas, respectively. In order to detect the target and trans-
mit the desired information to the legitimate receiver, the
transmit array of the MIMO radar emits a modulated wave-
form s1(t), which consists of L1 information bits, defined
as follows:
s1(t) =
L1−1∑
i=0
δ1im(t − iT )
where δ1i denotes the ith information bit, m(t) =∑Lm−1
i=0 ci(t − iTc) defines the modulation waveform, ci
denotes the ith chip value of the modulation sequence, (t)
stands for the rectangular pulse of duration Tc, T = LmTc
represents the information bit duration, and Lm is the
spreading gain [29]. To secure both the detection of the
target and the interruption to the eavesdropper, the MIMO
radar simultaneously transmits a pseudorandom distor-
tional waveform s2(t), which is written as follows:
s2(t) =
L2−1∑
i=0
δ2i(t − iTc)
where δ2i is the ith random bit of the distortional pseudoran-
dom sequence and L2 denotes the length of the sequence.
As expected, the distortion signal must be different from
the information signal in order to confuse the eavesdropper
and to cause decoding failure for the eavesdropper. Both
s1(t) and s2(t) are assumed to have unit variance, however,
the power of these signals will be controlled by the norm of
the beamformer vectors. We expect very large values for L1
and L2, so that both the information signal and distortion
have almost zero autocorrelation (for nonzero time lags)
and correlation values. This will provide desired range-
Doppler ambiguity function for the radars. Another possi-
ble improvement to range-Doppler ambiguity function can
be obtained by designing the distortion signals such that
when added with the communication signals, the overall
waveform provides a good range-Doppler ambiguity func-
tion. However, it means that a set of distortion functions
needs to be designed according to instantaneous informa-
tion bits that are used for communication signals. Such
waveform design is not considered in this paper, however,
it may be an area of further investigation.
The channel gain coefficient matrix among the transmit
and receive arrays of the MIMO radar for a signal impinging
on a far-field target is denoted as Hr ∈ CM×M and it depends
on the respective target position and RCS, as shown in the
following definition [1]:
Hr = βb(θt )a(θt )T
where β is the complex amplitude proportional to the RCS
of the target and a(θt ) and b(θt ) are the M × 1 transmit and
receive steering vectors for the MIMO radar corresponding
to the target, respectively, given as follows:
a(θt ) = [1, ej 2πλ dr sin(θt ), . . . , ej 2πλ (M−1)dr sin(θt )]T
b(θt ) = [1, ej 2πλ dr sin(θt ), . . . , ej 2πλ (M−1)dr sin(θt )]T
where dr denotes the distance between the adjacent an-
tennas of the radar, θt is the azimuth direction of the target
when the radar is considered as reference, and λ is the wave-
length of the transmitted signal. Furthermore, the channel
coefficient matrices between the radar and the legitimate re-
ceiver as well as the eavesdropping target are represented by
Hc ∈ CNc×M and He ∈ CNe×M , respectively. He is obtained
as follows:
He = α ˜b(θr )a(θt )T
where α represents a predefined propagation loss vari-
able, ˜b(θr ) = [1, ej 2πλ dt sin(θr ), . . . , ej 2πλ (Ne−1)dt sin(θr )]T is the
receive steering vector at the receiving antenna array of
the eavesdropping target, dt is the distance among the ad-
jacent antennas of the eavesdropper, and θr denotes the
direction of the MIMO radar as observed from the eaves-
dropping target. Due to the line of sight of the aerial tar-
get, the matrices Hr and He are rank one according to
the above-mentioned formulation. However, the matrix Hc
does not necessarily need to be rank one, due to multipath
propagations and scatterers. Matrix Hc can be estimated
using training signals emitted from the MIMO radar and
received at the legitimate receiver. We consider that the en-
vironment is quasi-stationary during the transmission of a
number of data packets, and hence matrix Hc is considered
to be known to the legitimate receiver and the transmitter
through appropriate feedback channel. In the simulation,
we assume elements of this matrix to go through Rayleigh
fading, hence assumed the elements to be zero mean circu-
larly symmetric complex Gaussian variables. At this point,
we can model the received signals at the radar receiver ar-
ray, the legitimate receiver, and the eavesdropping target as
follows:
yr (t) = Hrx1(t − τr )p(t) + Hrx2(t − τr )p(t) + nr (t)
yc(t) = Hcx1(t − τc) + Hcx2(t − τc) + nc(t)
ye(t)=Hex1(t−τe)pˆ(t)+Hex2(t−τe)pˆ(t)+ne(t) (1)
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where xi(t) = wi si(t), i = 1, 2, represents the M × 1
signal intended for the communication receiver when i = 1
and the distortional signal when i = 2; wi denotes the
M × 1 transmit beamforming vector corresponding to sig-
nal si(t). The round-trip delay between the MIMO radar
and the target is given by τr , the delay between the radar
and the communication receiver is denoted by τc and the
one-way delay from the radar to the target is τe = τr2 . p(t),
and pˆ(t) represents the Doppler effect at the radar receiver
and the eavesdropper, respectively, where p(t) = ej2πfDt
and pˆ(t) = ej2π ˆfDt , fD,i and ˆfD,i denote the normalized
Doppler shifts at the radar and the eavesdropper, respec-
tively. Since we assume that the legitimate communica-
tion receiver is stationary, there is no Doppler effect at
its receivers, however fading is considered according to
Rayleigh fading model as described above. The noise vec-
tors at the radar receive array, the legitimate receiver and
the eavesdropping target are considered as zero mean circu-
larly symmetric white Gaussian noise (WGN) with variance
σ 2r , σ
2
c , and σ 2e , and are denoted by nr (t), nc(t), and ne(t),
respectively.
The waveform lengths L1 and L2 can be different,
however, we assume we process the radar return at ev-
ery L = min(L2, L1Lm) samples, i.e., at every LTc sec-
onds. We also assume L to be large enough so that∫
LTc
s1(t)s2(t)dt is arbitrarily small. The received signal
yr (t) at the MIMO radar is sent to a bank of two matched
filters, designed to match each of the orthogonal waveforms
s1(t) and s2(t) over the period of L samples, incorporating
the appropriate time delay and Doppler shift. Subsequently,
the corresponding energy at the output of the matched filter
is accumulated and the SINR regarding the detection of the
target can be written as follows:
SINRr = ‖HrW1H
H
r ‖ + ‖HrW2HHr ‖
1 + 2 + σ 2r
(2)
where W1 = w1wH1 and W2 = w2wH2 denote the transmit
covariance matrices of the legitimate information signal
and the distortion signal, respectively, 1 = ‖HrW1H
H
r ‖
L
and
2 = ‖HrW2H
H
r ‖
L
represent the residual interference when
matched filtering the received signal with s2(t) and s1(t),
respectively, and L denotes the radar matched filtering se-
quence length. Since we assume that L is arbitrarily large,
1 and 2 can be neglected for the rest of this paper. It is
important to mention that both signals are utilized for target
detection at the radar receiver, and thus they both appear at
the numerator of (2). However, the legitimate receiver and
the eavesdropper can harvest desired information only from
x1(t), while x2(t) is considered as interference. Both the le-
gitimate receiver and the eavesdropper perform matched
filtering on the received signal using the modulation wave-
form m(t) at every LmTc seconds to decode the information
bits. Hence, the achievable transmission rate by the legiti-
mate receiver can be expressed as [30] follows:
Rc = log
∣∣∣∣∣I + (HcW1H
H
c )
(
HcW2HHc
Lm
+ σ 2c
)−1∣∣∣∣∣ . (3)
Similarly, the achievable rate of the eavesdropper, while in-
tercepting desired information transmitted from the MIMO
radar and intended for the legitimate receiver can be written
as follows:
Re = log
∣∣∣∣∣I + (HeW1H
H
e
(
HeW2HHe
Lm
+ σ 2e
)−1∣∣∣∣∣ . (4)
The secrecy rate of the legitimate user against the eaves-
dropper is defined as the difference between the achiev-
able rates at the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper
[19], [31]:
SR = [Rc − Re] + . (5)
III. SYSTEM OPTIMIZATIONS
In this section, we consider three optimization problems
that lead to an efficient system, in terms of target detection
combined with secure communication and energy efficient
operation. More specifically, we design a secrecy rate max-
imization problem, a power minimization problem, and a
target return SINR maximization problem. It is assumed
that the MIMO radar has private information on the tar-
get and the legitimate receiver locations, and hence perfect
channel state information (Hr , Hc, He).
A. Secrecy Rate Maximization
It is typical in radar systems design, the target detec-
tion to be constrained by a certain SINR threshold. In order
to satisfy the detection criterion and a maximum transmit
power budget, we consider the following secrecy rate max-
imization problem:
max
W1,W2
SR
s.t. SINRr ≥ γr
Tr(W1) + Tr(W2) ≤ Pmax
W1  0, W2  0 (6)
where γr represents the predefined SINR threshold and Pmax
denotes the maximum available power for the system. The
last two constraints suggest that the two transmit covariance
matrices must be positive semidefinite. By substituting (2)
and (5) into (6), we can reformulate the optimization prob-
lem as in the following equation:
max
W1,W2
log
∣∣∣∣∣I + (HcW1H
H
c )
(
HcW2HHc
Lm
+ σ 2c
)−1∣∣∣∣∣ − log
×
∣∣∣∣∣I + (HeW1H
H
e
(
HeW2HHe
Lm
+ σ 2e
)−1∣∣∣∣∣
s.t.
‖HrW1HHr ‖ + ‖HrW2HHr ‖
σ 2r
≥ γr
Tr(W1) + Tr(W2) ≤ Pmax
W1  0, W2  0. (7)
However, the objective function of (7) is not concave
in terms of the transmit covariance matrices W1 and W2,
and thus it cannot be straightforwardly solved via interior
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point methods. To circumvent this deficiency, we can ap-
proximate the secrecy rate of the system using Taylor series
approximation. To begin with, we can rewrite the secrecy
rate function as follows:
SR = log
∣∣∣∣σ
2
c I + HcW1HHc +
HcW2HHc
Lm
∣∣∣∣
+ log
∣∣∣∣σ
2
e I +
HeW2HHe
Lm
∣∣∣∣ − log
∣∣∣∣σ
2
c I +
HcW2HHc
Lm
∣∣∣∣
− log
∣∣∣∣σ
2
e I + HeW1HHe +
HeW2HHe
Lm
∣∣∣∣ . (8)
The last two terms of (8) cause the nonconcavity of the se-
crecy rate function. By exploiting Taylor series expansion,
we can approximate (8), as shown in (9). It is apparent that
(9) is concave with regard to W1 and W2 since the first two
terms are concave functions and the rest are either constant
or affine. The proof of the Taylor series approximation of
the secrecy rate function can be found in the Appendix
SR ≈ log
∣∣∣∣σ
2
c I + HcW1HHc +
HcW2HHc
Lm
∣∣∣∣ + log
×
∣∣∣∣σ
2
e I +
HeW2HHe
Lm
∣∣∣∣ − log
∣∣∣∣∣σ
2
c I +
Hc ˜W2HHc
Lm
∣∣∣∣∣
− Tr
⎡
⎣
(
σ 2c I +
Hc ˜W2HHc
Lm
)−1
HcW2HHc
Lm
⎤
⎦
+ Tr
⎡
⎣
(
σ 2c I +
Hc ˜W2HHc
Lm
)−1
Hc ˜W2HHc
Lm
⎤
⎦
− log
∣∣∣∣∣σ
2
e I + He ˜W1HHe +
He ˜W2HHe
Lm
∣∣∣∣∣
− Tr
⎡
⎣
(
σ 2e I + He ˜W1HHe +
He ˜W2HHe
Lm
)−1
×
(
HeW1HHe +
HeW2HHe
Lm
)]
+ Tr
⎡
⎣
(
σ 2e I + He ˜W1HHe +
He ˜W2HHe
Lm
)−1
×
(
He ˜W1HHe +
He ˜W2HHe
Lm
)]
 ˜SR. (9)
By replacing the objective function of (7) with (9),
we obtain the following approximated convex optimization
problem:
max
W1,W2
˜SR
s.t. SINRr ≥ γr
Tr(W1) + Tr(W2) ≤ Pmax
W1  0, W2  0 (10)
where ˜SR is defined in (9). The solution of (10) is dependent
on the selection of the initial values ˜W1 and ˜W2 and is
Algorithm 1: System Optimizations.
1 Set initialization values for transmit covariance
matrices: ˜W1 = 0, ˜W2 = 0 for case I or
˜W1 = Wopt1, ˜W2 = Wopt2 for case II.
2 while the required accuracy is not reached do:
3 Obtain the suboptimal W∗1 and W∗2, by
performing the optimizations (10), (14), and (16)
for approximated secrecy rate maximization,
approximated SINR maximization, and
approximated transmit power minimization,
respectively.
4 Update ˜W1 ← W∗1 and ˜W2 ← W∗2
5 end while
derived by iteratively solving (10) based on updating ˜W1
and ˜W2. Thus, we consider two different initializations for
the initial ˜W1 and ˜W2: I) all zero transmit matrices for both
signals (i.e., ˜W1 = 0, ˜W2 = 0); and II) transmit covariance
matrices obtained from the solution of an SINR maximiza-
tion problem subject to only a maximum power constraint
and without the secrecy rate constraint (i.e., ˜W1 = Wopt1,
˜W2 = Wopt2)
max
Wopt1,Wopt2
SINRopt = ‖HrWopt1H
H
r ‖ + ‖HrWopt2HHr ‖
σ 2r
s.t. Tr(Wopt1) + Tr(Wopt2) ≤ Pmax. (11)
The transmit beamforming vectors wopt1 and wopt2 derived
by Wopt1 and Wopt2, respectively, produce a distortionless
response at the direction of the target. Considering the afore-
mentioned initializations I and II, we derive the solution of
(10) using the iterative algorithm presented in Algorithm
1, performing optimization (10). It should be highlighted
at this point that there are two cases for deriving wopt1 and
wopt2. If the rank of the respective transmit covariance ma-
trix is one, which is the ideal case, the optimal beamforming
vector is derived directly as the principal eigenvector of the
transmit covariance matrix multiplied by the square root of
the principal eigenvalue. On the other hand, if the rank of
Wopt1 or Wopt2 is greater than one, we resort to randomiza-
tion techniques to extract the transmit beamforming vectors
as explained in [32].
B. SINR Maximization
In the case when the secure communication with the
legitimate receiver demands a certain secrecy rate threshold
and there is a specific power budget imposed to the system,
we formulate an SINR maximization problem as follows:
max
W1,W2
SINRr
s.t. Tr(W1) + Tr(W2) ≤ Pmax
SR ≥ κr
W1  0, W2  0 (12)
where κr represents a desired secrecy rate threshold. By
using (2) and (5), the optimization problem (12) can be
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written as in (13).
max
W1,W2
‖HrW1HHr ‖ + ‖HrW2HHr ‖
σ 2r
s.t. Tr(W1) + Tr(W2) ≤ Pmax
log
∣∣∣∣∣I + (HcW1H
H
c )
(
HcW2HHc
Lm
+ σ 2c
)−1∣∣∣∣∣ − log
∣∣∣∣∣I + (HeW1H
H
e
(
HeW2HHe
Lm
+ σ 2e
)−1∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ κr
W1  0, W2  0. (13)
Similarly to the secrecy rate maximization problem (7), the
secrecy rate function causes the nonconvexity of the opti-
mization problem (13). Following the same approach as in
the previous section, we substitute the secrecy rate function
with the concave Taylor series approximated function (9).
Thus, we resort to the following convex problem:
max
W1,W2
SINRr
s.t. Tr(W1) + Tr(W2) ≤ Pmax
˜SR ≥ κr
W1  0, W2  0. (14)
Following the methodology in Section III-A, we solve the
convex problem (14) by applying Algorithm 1, using op-
timization (14). It is evident from (9), that if ˜W1 and ˜W2
are equal to W1 and W2, respectively, then the four trace
terms cancel out and the approximate secrecy rate ˜SR at
˜W1 and ˜W2 will be exactly the same as the real secrecy
rate SR from (5). Hence, since at convergence, ˜W1 and ˜W2
are equal to W1 and W2 (within the required accuracy), the
actual secrecy rate SR satisfies the secrecy rate threshold
constraint in (13) (SR ≥ κr ).
C. Transmit Power Minimization
To attenuate the threat of the eavesdropper and provide
secure information transfer, a certain secrecy rate threshold
is applied to the joint radar-communication scheme. Since
the other objective of the system is target detection, a pre-
defined SINR constraint is also required. In the case when
both constraints must be satisfied simultaneously, we for-
mulate a transmit power minimization problem at the radar
transmit array as follows:
min
W1,W2
Tr(W1) + Tr(W2)
s.t. SR ≥ κr
SINRr ≥ γr
W1  0, W2  0. (15)
As mentioned in Sections III-A and III-B, the secrecy
rate constraint introduces nonconvexity to the optimiza-
tion problem (15). Similar to the previous optimizations,
we replace the secrecy rate function with the Taylor series
approximated secrecy rate from (9) and (15) and can be
written as follows:
min
W1,W2
Tr(W1) + Tr(W2)
s.t. ˜SR ≥ κr
SINRr ≥ γr
W1  0, W2  0. (16)
The minimization problem (16) is convex and can be solved
using Algorithm 1 with optimization (16) and CVX soft-
ware [33]. Similarly to Section III-B, the actual secrecy rate
also satisfies the target secrecy rate constraint of (16) when
the algorithm converges.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
For the simulations, we consider a system similar to
Fig. 1 that consists of a MIMO radar, a multiple antenna
communication receiver, and an eavesdropping target. The
results illustrate the performance of the transmit covariance
matrices for all three different optimizations, namely the se-
crecy rate maximization, the target return SINR maximiza-
tion, and the transmit power minimization. It is assumed that
the MIMO radar consists of ten transmit/receive antennas
(M = 10), the legitimate receiver, and the target incorpo-
rate five receive antennas (Nc = Ne = 5). We also presume
that the tracking MIMO radar has information regarding
the approximate location of the legitimate receiver and the
target. More specifically, the referential direction of the tar-
get as seen from the radar is set to θt = 72◦. Moreover, the
eavesdropper is aware of the location of the radar, which
is placed at azimuth angle θr = −85◦, as observed from
the target. The legitimate receiver channel gain coefficients
(Hc) are perfectly known and for the simulations were gen-
erated using zero-mean circularly symmetric independent
and identically distributed complex Gaussian random vari-
ables. The RCS coefficient and the propagation loss variable
are fixed equal to 0.1 and 1, respectively (β = 0.1, α = 1).
The variance of the background WGN at the radar receive
array, the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropping target
are set equal to 1 (σ 2r = σ 2c = σ 2e = 1), and the spreading
gain of the modulation waveform is fixed to 8 b (Lm = 8).
A. Secrecy Rate Maximization
The first algorithm designs the transmit covariance ma-
trices for both the information and the distortion signals, by
utilizing Taylor series approximation to convert the secrecy
rate maximization problem to an approximated convex opti-
mization problem. Fig. 2 illustrates the convergence of both
the actual and the approximated secrecy rate to the solution
by considering the maximum transmit power Pmax = 10 W,
the SINR threshold γr = 5, and two different cases for Tay-
lor approximation initialization values regarding the trans-
mit covariance matrices ( ˜W1 = 0, ˜W2 = 0 for case I and
˜W1 = Wopt1, ˜W2 = Wopt2 for case II). It is evident that
for both initialization points, the algorithm converges to
the same solution within six iterations. Furthermore, it is
important to notice that the approximated secrecy rate is
almost identical to the actual secrecy rate at convergence,
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Fig. 2. Convergence of secrecy rate for the secrecy rate maximization
problem (10).
Fig. 3. Convergence of transmit power for the secrecy rate
maximization problem (10).
proving that the Taylor series approximation is efficient and
reliable.
The convergence of the transmit power of the two sig-
nals x1 and x2 is depicted in Fig. 3. It is obvious that inde-
pendent of the initial power allocation, P1 and P2 converge
to the same solution after eight iterations. An interesting
assumption from Fig. 3 is that the MIMO radar opts to al-
locate the majority of the power budget to the information
signal, using less power to induce deliberate interference to
the eavesdropper. In Fig. 4, we demonstrate the dependence
between the secrecy rate and the transmit power when we
keep the SINR threshold constant at γr = 5. Specifically, it
is shown that the secrecy rate of the system increases as the
power budget increases, which is expected, as more power
is available for the communication signal toward the legiti-
mate receiver, and moreover, for the distortion signal toward
the eavesdropper. In order to demonstrate the efficiency of
the proposed algorithm, we compare the achieved secrecy
rate from (10) with that of the secrecy rate maximization
method in [28]. In order for the algorithm in [28] to be ap-
plicable to our system model, we modify the suggested op-
timization by adding an SINR constraint and removing the
interference temperature constraints. The achieved secrecy
rate against the SINR target for a specific power budget of
Fig. 4. Achieved secrecy rate for different maximum power allowance
for the secrecy rate maximization problem (10).
Fig. 5. Achieved secrecy rate for different SINR thresholds for the
secrecy rate maximization problem (10) and the method of [28].
Pmax = 10 W is presented in Fig. 5 for both schemes. It
can be observed that the secrecy rate decreases as the SINR
target increases for both methods. This is because as the
SINR demand rises, the MIMO radar spends more energy
to focus the beamformers of both signals at the direction
of the target, and thus less power is used for the informa-
tion signal emission toward the direction of the legitimate
receiver. The proposed method offers higher secrecy rates
for different SINR targets as compared to the work in [28].
In a realistic scenario, the MIMO radar may have only
limited information regarding the number of the receiving
antennas of the eavesdropper. Hence, it is essential to in-
vestigate the sensitivity of our assumption regarding the
number of antennas of the eavesdropper. Hence, we solved
(10) for different numbers of eavesdropper’s receiving an-
tennas (Ne) and present the results in Table I. It is obvious
that for different numbers of Ne, both the achieved secrecy
rate and the eavesdropper’s achievable capacity remain al-
most identical. Thus, it is safe to presume that setting the
number of antennas at the receiving array of the eaves-
dropper at Ne = 5 does not affect the achieved secrecy rate
from (10).
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TABLE I
Achieved Secrecy Rate and Achievable Rate
of the Eavesdropper for Different
Values of Ne .
Fig. 6. Convergence of SINR for the SINR maximization problem (14).
Fig. 7. Convergence of transmit power for the SINR maximization
problem (14).
B. SINR Maximization
In this section, we employ Algorithm 1 and optimization
(14) to design W1 and W2 that provide the maximum possi-
ble SINR under a target secrecy rate and a maximum power
constraints. In particular, we set κr = 8 and Pmax = 10 W.
Fig. 6 shows the convergence regarding the SINR maxi-
mization problem (14) using two different initial sets for
˜W1 and ˜W2. The algorithm converges within five itera-
tions. The convergence of the transmit power for the two
signals is depicted in Fig. 7. As opposed to the secrecy rate
Fig. 8. Achieved SINR for different secrecy rate targets for the SINR
maximization problem (14).
TABLE II
Average SINR for
θt ∼ U(−mrob, mrob).
maximization problem results, the distortion signal is emit-
ted with increased power as compared to the information
signal. In Fig. 8, we demonstrate the relation among the
desired secrecy rate target and the achieved SINR, obtained
from the convex optimization problem (14) when the avail-
able power is set to Pmax = 10 W. It is obvious that when the
secrecy rate target increases, the achieved SINR decreases
since a greater part of the available power is allocated to
provide a safer communication with the legitimate receiver,
restraining the target detection efficiency.
The next example evaluates the sensitivity of the pro-
posed algorithm against potential mismatch between the
estimated target location, as seen from the radar, and the
actual location of the target. In order to examine the per-
formance loss, we perform 100 Monte Carlo simulations
using Algorithm 1 and optimization (14), when the esti-
mate of the angle of the target, as seen from the radar, is
set to ˆθt = θt ± θt , where the mismatch θt between the
true angle and its estimate is uniformly distributed in the
interval [−mrob, mrob]. For each set of Monte Carlo sim-
ulations, we set mrob = 0.5◦, 1◦, 1.5◦, 2◦, respectively, and
obtain the average SINR. It is observed from Table II that
the bigger the range of the mismatch, the greater the SINR
performance drop of the radar system. Combating the an-
gle mismatch case and implementing a robust DFRC sys-
tem against channel uncertainty can be a topic for future
research.
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Fig. 9. Convergence of the total transmit power for the power
minimization problem (16).
C. Transmit Power Minimization
log
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∣∣∣∣  log
×
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⎡
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⎦
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]
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He ˜W2HHe
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⎡
⎣
(
σ 2e I + He ˜W1HHe +
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×
(
HeW1HHe +
HeW2HHe
Lm
)]
− Tr
⎡
⎣
(
σ 2e I + He ˜W1HHe +
He ˜W2HHe
Lm
)−1
×
(
He ˜W1HHe +
He ˜W2HHe
Lm
)]
. (17)
By imposing target SINR and secrecy rate constraints,
we can design the transmit covariance matrices that min-
imize the transmitted energy using Algorithm 1 and opti-
mization (16). We set γr = 5 and κr = 5. Fig. 9 depicts the
convergence of the total transmitted power from the MIMO
radar when performing Algorithm 3. It is obvious that the
algorithm converges within ten iterations. The allocation of
the transmission power regarding the communication sig-
nal P1 and the distortion signal P2 for both cases I and II
is shown in Fig. 10. Finally the interdependence among the
total transmitted power and the secrecy rate threshold when
the SINR target is set to γr = 5 is depicted in Fig. 11. As ex-
pected, as the system requirements for safe communication
Fig. 10. Convergence of transmit power for the power minimization
problem (16).
Fig. 11. Total transmit power used to achieve different secrecy rate
targets for the secrecy rate maximization problem (10).
become more demanding (secrecy rate target increases), the
MIMO radar needs more power to satisfy the constraints.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper has studied optimization techniques for a
DFRC system, consisting of a MIMO radar, a legitimate
receiver, and an eavesdropping target. Initially, we defined
the SINR for the MIMO radar and the secrecy rate re-
garding the legitimate receiver against the eavesdropper.
Apart from detecting the target, the MIMO radar aims to
synchronously provide secure information transfer to the
legitimate receiver. To succeed that, we proposed three dif-
ferent optimizations, namely secrecy rate maximization,
SINR maximization, and transmit power minimization. To
overcome the nonconvexity of the aforementioned opti-
mizations, we utilize Taylor series approximation for the
secrecy rate function. The simulation results confirm that
the system can provide both efficient target detection, guar-
anteeing a predefined SINR threshold and also secure com-
munication, by achieving a target secrecy rate, under a given
resource budget.
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APPENDIX
TAYLOR SERIES APPROXIMATION OF THE SECRECY
RATE
The secrecy rate of the system defined in (5) is a differ-
ence of two concave functions, which does not guarantee
concavity of (5). By rearranging (5), we have the following
equation as shown in (8):
SR = log
∣∣∣∣σ
2
c I + HcW1HHc +
HcW2HHc
Lm
∣∣∣∣
+ log
∣∣∣∣σ
2
e I +
HeW2HHe
Lm
∣∣∣∣ − log
∣∣∣∣σ
2
c I +
HcW2HHc
Lm
∣∣∣∣
− log
∣∣∣∣σ
2
e I + HeW1HHe +
HeW2HHe
Lm
∣∣∣∣
where the last two negative log terms generate the non-
concavity of the secrecy rate function. Hence, to convert
SR into a concave function, we employ Taylor series ap-
proximation for the last two terms in (8). A first-order Tay-
lor series approximation of a function f (X) : RM×N → R
can be derived at an initial approximation ˜X as [34]
follows:
f (X) = f ( ˜X) + vec (f ′( ˜X)) vec(X − ˜X). (18)
By employing (18) and ∂(log |X|) = Tr(X−1∂X), the last
two terms of (8) can be reformulated to an affine first-order
Taylor series approximation as follows:
log
∣∣∣∣σ
2
c I +
HcW2HHc
Lm
∣∣∣∣  log
∣∣∣∣∣σ
2
c I +
Hc ˜W2HHc
Lm
∣∣∣∣∣
+ vec
⎡
⎣Hc
(
σ 2c I +
Hc ˜W2HHc
Lm
)−1
HHc
⎤
⎦ vec(W2 − ˜W2)
= log
∣∣∣∣∣σ
2
c I +
Hc ˜W2HHc
Lm
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+ Tr
⎡
⎣
(
σ 2c I +
Hc ˜W2HHc
Lm
)−1
HcW2HHc
Lm
⎤
⎦
− Tr
⎡
⎣
(
σ 2c I +
Hc ˜W2HHc
Lm
)−1
Hc ˜W2HHc
Lm
⎤
⎦ (19)
and (17), respectively.
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